DISSERTATION/BOOK PROJECT
(Re-)Fit For Purpose?: Organizational Reform in Global Health Partnerships
My dissertation investigates why multisectoral partnerships (MSPs) undergo repeated rounds of organizational restructuring, despite the fact that such efforts are costly and produce, at best, mixed results. I argue that restructuring is an exercise in organizational hypocrisy and ritual behavior which allows partners to cope with their ambivalence/ambiguity over the organization’s role and purpose. More specifically, there is a fundamental contradiction between the kinds of outputs and results that partners expect from the MSP and the kinds of inputs and resources they are willing to contribute to it. Restructuring lets partners take action and (ostensibly) attempt to make the organization “fit for purpose” without having to confront that contradiction. This behavior can undermine MSP stability and potentially lead to organizational collapse. These findings have important policy implications. Over the past 25 years, policymakers, particularly powerful donors, have shown a preference for working through MSPs rather than the UN system, which they consider “dysfunctional”. My research suggests that partnerships, as an organizational form, come with their own forms of dysfunction and that, in the long run, they may actually be less stable than traditional intergovernmental organizations. My findings are based, in part, on in-depth case studies of three episodes of restructuring across two partnerships: the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 2013, and Roll Back Malaria in 2006 and 2015.
COMMITTEE
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Martha Finnemore (chair); Michael Barnett; Henry Farrell; Suerie Moon
Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy George Washington University Embassy of Switzerland ThinkSwiss Program |
OTHER WORK IN PROGRESS
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Excuses, Excuses: Rhetorical Contests & Sovereignty in Global Health Governance
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States involved in disputes often attempt to justify their behavior by engaging in rhetorical contests, offering normative arguments to legitimate their position and delegitimate their opponents’. In particular, states frequently leverage strict sovereignty norms to justify non-compliance with international commitments. Where justifications fail, states may alter their behavior. But what makes justifications successful? Why are similar normative argument sometimes accepted and sometimes rejected? I argue that “tenability”—meaning the ability to follow through on the behavioral implications of an argument—is a necessary permissive condition for successful justifications. Tenability depends upon material capability, a finding that challenges accepted notions about the relationship between rhetoric and material factors. Because strict sovereignty norms fuse authority and control, a state’s ability to successfully use sovereignty arguments to justify non-compliance hinges on its capacity to exercise effective control over the behavior in question. To illustrate this, I compare two cases of non-compliance with global health commitments: China’s refusal to share data during the SARS epidemic and Indonesia’s refusal to share flu virus samples. I show that the ability to control the dissemination of information is crucial to explaining why Indonesia’s sovereignty justification succeeded while China’s failed.
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The Frame Makes the Painting?: Frame Contestation & Change in Global Health Governance
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IR offers a rich body of literature on issue framing and counter-framing. But frames can be displaced and replaced in ways other than counter-framing and this broader set space remains to be enumerated. I develop a typology of mechanisms for frame change and erosion, paying particular attention to the ways in which once-dominant frames lose traction. I identify four key mechanisms: counter-framing (including discrediting, reinterpreting, and outcompeting), trend chasing, issue centralization, and issue decentralization. These mechanisms differ according to whether the source of pressure for change is a) exogenous or endogenous to the community endorsing a particular frame; and b) chiefly agentic or structural. I illustrate these mechanisms with examples from global health governance debates. Moreover, I argue that if frames are influential in shaping policy, we should expect policies to change in response to frame changes, at least in cases where competing frames imply different policy solutions. I test this proposition through a case study of HIV securitization discourse. I find that while frame displacement can indeed affect policy responses, it is easier to lose momentum on policies linked to the displaced frame than to transfer or generate momentum on policies linked to the new frame.
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Friends in Strange Places: Unexpected State Partnerships in Global Health
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A group of leading think-tanks recently ranked issues offering hope for global cooperation. Global health was #2. This ranking speaks to broader perceptions of global health as a (relatively) “easy case” for cooperation—perceptions that greatly oversimplify the nature of global health challenges and underestimate the extent to which interests conflict. Nevertheless, the global health landscape is studded with examples of “unexpected partnerships” in which states with adversarial relationships are able to find grounds for productive cooperation. What accounts for these unusual instances of cooperation? Under what conditions are they possible? And what, if any, implications do they have for cooperation in other spheres? I examine three unexpected partnerships: US & USSR on smallpox eradication, US & Iran on the Mississippi Delta Rural Health Care Project, and US & Cuba on Ebola. These cases capture both state-led and grassroots initiatives, formal and informal cooperation, and various degrees of thaw in overall diplomatic relations. I argue that partnerships emerge from either convenience or necessity and are characterized by three main tropes: exceptionality, urgency, and respect. Their framing and level of publicity depends on the temperature of overall diplomatic relations. However, they seem to have only limited independent effect on those relations.
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"Barguing":
The Coercive Power of Legitimacy in International Negotiations |
Negotiation is the essential task of international politics and IR scholars of all stripes devote significant energy to theorizing and modeling negotiation behavior. Most of this work builds on—or at least implicitly accepts—basic typological divisions, such as arguing vs. bargaining, persuasion vs. coercion, and strategic vs. communicative action. But many of these distinctions are outdated. In particular, the distinction between arguing and bargaining loses meaning in light of insights about the coercive power of legitimacy and normative arguments. This paper makes two arguments. First, while we generally assume that states deploy normative arguments against opponents in order to exact legitimacy or reputational costs, I show that normative arguments can also impose material costs. Second, I present a “baseline typology” that reflects current understandings of rhetorical negotiating behavior, argue that the distinction between arguing and bargaining on which this typology rests is flawed, and propose a new, simplified typology that corrects this error. I illustrate my arguments using case studies from the TRIPS-pharmaceutical negotiations in the Doha Round and the virus sharing negotiations between Indonesia and the World Health Organization.
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